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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kent Glen Williams appeals from his convictions for two counts of robbery
and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, with enhancements for use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony and being a persistent violator of the law.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Williams for (1) a bank robbery committed on April
14, 2015, (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (3) a bank robbery
committed on July 22, 2015; with a firearm enhancement on the second robbery.
(R., pp. 87-88, 314-15.)

The state also charged a persistent violator

enhancement. (R., pp. 62-63.) Williams moved to sever the robbery charges for
separate trials. (R., pp. 122-32.) The state objected to the motion for severance.
(R., pp. 134-44.) The district court denied the motion. (Tr., p. 52, L. 6 – p. 64, L.
14.1)
The case proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury returned
guilty verdicts on all charges and enhancements. (R., pp. 372-74.) Williams filed
a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 394, 399.)

Citations to the “Tr.” are to the transcript containing the trial and most of the pretrial hearings. Additional transcripts are referenced either by date of hearing,
e.g., “02/05/16 Tr.,” or by proceeding, e.g., “G.J. Tr.” for grand jury proceedings.
1
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ISSUES
Williams states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying
Mr. Williams’s motion for relief from the prejudicial joinder of
both bank robbery charges?

II.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by disparaging
defense counsel and vouching for the police during closing
arguments?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Williams further raises the following issues in his
supplemental brief:
Does the Idaho Constitution, Article I, section 13 bestow to a
I.
criminal defendant the right to co-counsel or “hybrid”
representation?
II.
Were the restraints placed on Mr. Williams at pre-trial
hearings so excessive and prejudicial that it violated his right to a
fair trial; and was his right to be present at all court proceedings
violated?
III.
Did the trial court error on not granting Mr. William’s multiple
requests for a continuance to appoint new counsel; and not
declaring a mistrial, sua sponte, when the record reflected Mr.
Williams was not receiving adequate or competent representation?
IV.
Was Mr. William’s 6th Amendment right to self representation
violated by the restrictions put in place by the court if he was to
represent himself at trial?
V.
Was the arrest of Mr. Williams and warrant to search his
motel room illegal, and should the evidence “obtained” as a result
be suppressed?
(Supplemental brief, p. 1 (some capitalization and spelling corrected).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Williams failed to show any abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that, because most of the evidence applicable to either robbery
charge would be admissible to prove the other robbery charge, there would be no
insurmountable prejudice from trying the robbery charges in a single trial?
2

2.
Has Williams failed to show prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument,
much less fundamental error?
3.

Has Williams failed to show error in the supplemental briefing?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Williams Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s
Determination That There Would Be No Insurmountable Prejudice From Trying
The Robbery Charges In A Single Trial
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Williams’ motion to sever the robbery counts.

(Tr., p. 52, L. 6 – p. 64, L. 14.) The district court specifically found there was “a
common scheme present sufficient to allow joinder under Rule 8.” (Tr., p. 59, Ls.
10-11.)

The district court also found that “severance wouldn’t provide relief”

because under I.R.E. 404(b) “the evidence of one crime would be admissible in
the case of the other to prove identity, and so the defense would be facing the
same evidence in any event.” (Tr., p. 61, L. 22 – p. 62, L. 3.) In making its I.R.E.
404(b) ruling and addressing potential prejudice from a joint trial, the district court
stated:
The court is convinced that the evidence of one robbery would be
admissible in the trial of the other under 404(b). The evidence is
very compelling, identity or signature evidence. While any one of
the common facts might be coincidental or common to the crime of
bank robbery, the commonality all taken together make a
compelling case that the same person committed each robbery.
Further, much of the evidence found upon execution of the search
warrants is relevant to both of the robberies. Trying the cases
together is a proper allocation and preservation of judicial
resources and any prejudice or confusion can be addressed with
appropriate jury instructions.
(Tr., p. 63, L. 24 – p. 64, L. 12.)
Williams claims the district court abused its discretion because “the
evidence of one robbery would not be admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) in the

4

trial of the other.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.2)

Review, however, shows this

argument to be without merit because Williams has failed to show any error in
the district court’s analysis that the evidence strongly suggested that the robber
in both incidents was the same person, and therefore the evidence was
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) to show identity.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of

a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007). Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under
a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other
than propensity is given free review while the determination of whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho
49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).
C.

Williams Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Ruling That Because
Most Of The Evidence Of Either Robbery Would Be Admissible To Prove
The Other Williams Suffered Minimal Prejudice From A Joint Trial
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 governs motions to sever and provides, in relevant

part:

Williams does not concede that the district court correctly determined that
joinder was proper because both robberies were part of a common scheme, but
does not challenge that ruling either. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6, n. 3.) Because
Williams bears the burden of establishing error on appeal, that ruling must be
presumed correct. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97
(2009) (“This Court will not presume error on appeal, and an appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating error through the record.”).
2
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If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses … in a complaint, indictment or information or by such
joinder for trial together, the court may … grant separate trials of
counts ….
“When reviewing an order denying a severance motion, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice
resulted from a joint trial.” State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d
1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 2013).

The district court will not be deemed to have

abused its discretion “[i]n the absence of some specific showing of prejudice.”
State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 538, 817 P.2d 646, 652 (1991). In this case
the district court found no unfair prejudice that could not be adequately
addressed through instructions.

(Tr., p. 63, Ls. 24 – p. 64, L. 12.) Review

supports the district court’s analysis and conclusion.
The district court first held that unfair prejudice was minimal because “the
evidence of one robbery would be admissible in the trial of the other under
404(b).” (Tr., p. 63, L. 24 – p. 64, L. 1.) Application of the relevant law supports
this analysis.
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a
defendant’s criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible for
a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”

State v. Truman,

150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). Under I.R.E.
404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.

I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211

(1993). “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is
6

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”

State v. Martin,

118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original).
The district court relied on 15 similarities between the April and July bank
robberies in its analysis and conclusion that the commonality of the facts of the
robberies “taken together make a compelling case that the same person
committed each robbery” (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 1-6):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

The robberies were “relatively close in time, separated by three months
approximately” (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 16-19);
“the perpetrator in each was a Caucasian male somewhere between 5’8”
and 6-foot or just over 6-foot” (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 19-21);
the perpetrator in each robbery was described as “having a similar general
appearance” (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 21-22);
“both banks were local Boise branches of Key Bank” (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 2223);
both robberies occurred “very shortly after the bank opened at 9:00 a.m.
before 9:30” (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 23-25);
in both “the perpetrator was wearing a billed dark cap with a long-sleeved
jacket” (Tr., p. 54, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 1);
“in both cases the perpetrator, upon entering the bank, pulled up a
handkerchief over his mouth and nose covering most of his face” (Tr.,
p. 55, Ls. 1-4);
the perpetrator in each robbery wore “mirrored navigator sunglasses” that
matched surveillance photos (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 4-7);
in both cases the long-sleeved jacket and handkerchief mask were “colorcoordinated” (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 7-10);
the perpetrator in each robbery had “some sort of binding system” to hold
the handkerchief up and over the face; in the July robbery a teller saw “a
handsewn-in elastic band” which was consistent with what may have been
used in the April robbery (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 10-17);
the perpetrator in each robbery had “knowledge of how banks, and in
particular this bank, Key Bank, was laid out” (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 18-20);
in both robberies the perpetrator “appeared to know and demanded in
each case that cash be taken from two teller drawers” that were hidden
from regular customers (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 20-25);
the perpetrator in each robbery “asked specifically for 20s, 50s and 100s
by denomination” (Tr., p. 55, L. 25 – p. 56, L. 3);
in each robbery the perpetrator instructed the tellers not to “include any
dye, any bait or any trackers” (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 3-5); and
7

15.

in both cases “the perpetrator was very easily and quickly able to identify
an electronic tracker that was hidden inside a bill” (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 5-11).
The district court also noted some of the other evidence obtained by

police, including that obtained by execution of warrants: the car used in the April
robbery likely belonged to Williams (Tr., p. 56, L. 14 – p. 57, L. 13); a particular
identifying characteristic seen on the hand of the robber at the April robbery was
also present on Williams (Tr., p. 57, Ls. 14-21); police found “two other sets of
color matching long-sleeved shirt and handkerchief” in Williams’ possession (Tr.,
p. 57, L. 22 – p. 58, L. 1); the handkerchiefs had an “elastic band custom sewn
into the back” (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 1-4); Williams had sewing materials consistent with
having sewn in the elastic mask holders (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 4-6); Williams had a
handgun “consistent with the one that was … displayed in the July bank robbery”
(Tr., p. 58, Ls. 6-8); police found “approximately $7,000” in hundred dollar bills,
some of which had sequential serial numbers (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 8-13); and Williams
had “several pairs of mirrored navigator-type sunglasses matching the
description [of glasses] used in both robberies” (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 13-15).
The district court reasoned that any of this evidence “taken by itself” was
not necessarily distinctive or uncommon.

(Tr., p. 58, Ls. 16-17.)

“What is

distinctive and uncommon, and in the court’s view sufficient to identify a common
scheme or make it highly suggestive that the same person committed both
crimes, is that when you apply all of these things together, it makes a signaturetype of event, very unique as to the way the robber operated in both robberies.”
(Tr., p. 58, Ls. 17-23.) The similarities between the robberies went “beyond mere
coincidence.” (Tr., p. 58, L. 24 – p. 59, L. 9.)
8

The facts and the law support the district court’s analysis. The evidence
shows two bank robberies with a series of commonalities that, taken individually,
might mean nothing, but, taken together, strongly suggest that they were
committed by the same person (and that the person was Williams). The district
court pointed out that a common scheme is shown by “crimes that share features
idiosyncratic in character which permit an inference that each individual offense
was committed by the same person or persons as a part of a pattern of criminal
activity involving certain identified crimes; whereas common plan described
crimes related to one another for the purpose of accomplishing a particular goal.”
(Tr., p. 54, Ls. 1-10 (citing Scott v. Com., 651 S.E.2d 630, 635 (Va. 2007) (“The
term ‘common scheme’ describes crimes that share features idiosyncratic in
character, which permit an inference that each individual offense was committed
by the same person or persons as part of a pattern of criminal activity involving
certain identified crimes.”)).)

The district court further concluded that the

evidence “is very compelling, identity or signature evidence.” (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 1-2.)
Indeed, the odds that two different robbers would randomly employ such nearly
identical methods of robbing two banks in the same chain in the same timeperiod are astronomical.
Williams argues that the facts, even taken as a whole, “are not distinctive
or remarkable. An early morning bank robbery committed by an average white
male with a disguise and some knowledge of teller drawers and tracking bills is
not so unusual that it tends to identify the individual of the prior robbery.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Were this an accurate and complete description of the
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facts, the state might agree with Williams. Williams’ analysis, however, merely
ignores the most relevant facts.3

When all of the facts are included in the

analysis the ruling of the district court is perfectly sound.
Williams also relies on one difference he believes prevents a
determination that the evidence of one robbery is relevant to identity in the other
robbery. “[I]n the April robbery, the perpetrator did not display a weapon; in the
July robbery, the perpetrator showed the tellers a handgun in his waistband.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) The district court, however, addressed that difference
and included it in its totality analysis. (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 8-18.)
Moreover, the district court determined that the difference was not as stark
as Williams would have it seem. “In April, he kept his hand in his jacket except
when he was reaching up to take the money and, in July, he pulled up his … coat
over his waistband and showed them the weapon[.]” (1/29/16 Tr., p. 36, L. 24 –
p. 37, L. 2; see also Tr., p. 54, Ls. 13-16 (incorporating prior articulation of facts).)
The district court also found it significant that in the July robbery “the perpetrator
lifted his shirt and showed a handgun” when he discovered the tracker as the
teller handed it to him, whereas in the April robbery the robber did not discover
the tracker until he was in his car in a parking lot a short distance from the bank.
(Tr., p. 56, Ls. 8-15.) Because an inference from the evidence is that the robber
in April in fact had a gun in his pocket but did not otherwise display it (9/22/15
G.J. Tr., p. 20, L. 18 – p. 21, L. 17 (teller in the April robbery testified that the
Williams’ counsel recites a fairly accurate summary of the facts found by the
district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) It is only the analysis where most of
those facts, and all of the truly significant ones, are omitted. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 10.)
3
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robber’s hand “was in his pocket until he reached for the money” and that he
complied with the demand for money, in part, because he “didn’t want to see a
weapon”)), the difference in the robberies is not particularly weighty. Williams
has failed to show that the evidence showing the remarkable similarities in the
robberies was irrelevant to show that they were committed by the same person.
Williams next argues that the district court abused its discretion in
balancing the potential for unfair prejudice against the probative value of the
evidence, noting that the evidence linking Williams to the April robbery is stronger
than that linking him to the July robbery. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.) Williams’
argument fundamentally misunderstands the district court’s analysis. The district
court concluded that the commonalities of the two crimes “make a compelling
case that the same person committed each robbery.” (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 1-6.) Thus,
evidence that Williams committed the April robbery is properly considered as
identity evidence in both robberies.

The jury is not being asked to believe

Williams committed the July robbery because his commission of the April robbery
shows a propensity to commit robbery; rather, the evidence is that both robberies
were committed by the same robber, and therefore if Williams committed the
April robbery he likely also committed the July robbery. By failing to recognize
this important distinction Williams misunderstands the district court’s ruling and
his argument that all the evidence is prejudicial is without basis.
The district court determined that the commonalities of the robberies
present a “compelling case that the same person committed each robbery” and
therefore the evidence of both is admissible as identity evidence to prove both

11

robberies and, therefore, there would be little prejudice in trying the robbery
charges together. (Tr., p. 61, L. 22 – p. 62, L. 3; p. 63, L. 24 – p. 64, L. 14.)
Williams has failed to show error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s
analysis or ruling.
II.
Williams Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument,
Much Less Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
During opening statements the prosecution informed the jury it would be

hearing evidence that police found a handgun, ammunition and magazines when
they executed search warrants on Williams’ hotel room and car. (Tr., p. 375, Ls.
7-23.) Defense counsel asserted that Williams would tell the jury “adamantly,
without a doubt, he did not possess a firearm, ammunition, holster, clips or
anything associated with these guns.”

(Tr., p. 383, Ls. 17-19.)

Williams,

however, after the state had presented its case, elected to not testify and invoked
his right against compelled self-incrimination. (Tr., p. 754, Ls. 4-5.) Defense
counsel also, in opening statement and closing argument, repeatedly asserted
that officers, based on presumptions and assumptions, were trying to “pin” the
robberies on Williams. (Tr., p. 380, Ls. 3-22; p. 802, L. 17 – p. 803, L. 7.)
In rebuttal closing argument the prosecution pointed out that defense
counsel’s allegations in his opening statement that Williams did not possess a
gun were not evidence, and that there was no evidence to support those factual
assertions. (Tr., p. 815, L. 25 – p. 816, L. 7.) The prosecution went through the
evidence that the gun, ammunition and loaded magazines had been found in
12

Williams’ hotel room and car and concluded by arguing the gun had not been
planted by the police as implied by Williams’ counsel. (Tr., p. 816, Ls. 8-18.)
The prosecutor then took on the allegation that police were trying to “pin” these
crimes on Williams, saying the claim was “ludicrous” because the evidence did
not in any way support it. (Tr., p. 816, L. 18 – p. 817, L. 12.) The prosecutor
characterized the claims that evidence was planted and the police were trying to
pin the crimes on Williams as “offensive” and unsupported by the evidence, and
argued that the case was instead one of good police work. (Tr., p. 817, L. 13 –
p. 818, L. 11.)
For the first time on appeal, Williams claims that the prosecutor’s
argument was improper, rising to the level of prosecutorial misconduct and
fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-19.) Williams’ claim is meritless.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When prosecutorial misconduct is not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate

courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the
violation in question qualifies as fundamental error.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To prevail on a claim of fundamental error a
defendant must demonstrate (1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right;
(2) that the error is clear or obvious and lack of objection was not tactical; and
(3) prejudice. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
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C.

Williams’ Claims Of Fundamental Error Are Without Merit
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the

right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008); State
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Phillips,
144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).

The purpose of the

prosecutor’s closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450,
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where, as here, the complained of

comments occurred during a rebuttal closing argument, the United States
Supreme Court has held, “[t]he prosecutors’ comments must be evaluated in light
of the defense argument that preceded it.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
179 (1986).
In opening statement and closing argument the defense contended that
the gun, ammunition and magazines officers stated they found in Williams’ hotel
room and car were not in fact Williams’ and that officers were trying to “pin” the
robberies on Williams. (Tr., p. 380, Ls. 3-22; p. 383, Ls. 17-19; p. 802, L. 17 –
p. 803, L. 7.) The prosecutor properly responded by arguing that the defense
theory that the firearm was planted and that the officers were trying to “pin” a
crime on an innocent man was unsupported by the evidence and in fact the
evidence showed good police work. The only even arguably objectionable part
of that argument was the prosecutor’s statement that the defense theory was
“offensive to me.” (Tr., p. 817, L. 13; p. 818, L. 7.) However, in context, even
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that argument was not objectionable. See State v. Gutierrez, 143 Idaho 289,
294-95, 141 P.3d 1158, 1163-64 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding argument that jury
“should be offended by the comments that were made about the victim in this
case” were “not improper” “in context”).
Even if subject to a valid objection, it is far from clear that the argument
amounted to a constitutional violation. “[T]he United States Supreme Court has
noted that in determining whether a prosecutor’s comment violated the Fifth
Amendment, ‘a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations.’” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d
414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).
Nothing in the record suggests the prosecutor was arguing based on matters
other than the evidence presented; rather, the prosecutor’s argument is based on
the “tons of evidence” showing Williams robbed two banks. (Tr., p. 817, Ls. 4-6;
see also Tr., p. 814, L. 19 – p. 815, L. 23 (going over instruction regarding what
is evidence that excludes arguments of counsel); p. 815, L. 23 – p. 816, L. 15
(“evidence does not support” allegation that gun was planted); p. 818, Ls. 12-13
(state’s theory supported by “plenty of evidence”).)
Finally, there is no basis for a finding of prejudice in the record. The
prosecutor started out his rebuttal argument by reading the court’s instruction on
what was evidence, excluding the arguments of counsel and that the jury was to
base its verdict only on the evidence. (Tr., p. 814, L. 19 – p. 815, L. 19.) The
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prosecutor even pointed out that the instruction meant his own argument was not
evidence. (Tr., p. 815, Ls. 20-23.) There is no reason to believe on this record
that the jury ignored its instructed duty. E.g., State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,
498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (jury presumed to follow instructions).
Williams argues on appeal that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was
misconduct for four reasons. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) Review of all four of
his claims shows them to be meritless.
First, he claims the prosecutor “disparaged defense counsel by labeling
his opening and closing remarks as ludicrous allegations.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 17-18.) This is, to coin a phrase, a ludicrous allegation. First, Williams is
stretching the truth when he labels the prosecutor’s statements regarding
ludicrous allegations as aimed at defense counsel’s “opening and closing
remarks.”

The prosecutor was clearly and specifically talking about the

allegations that officers planted the gun and were trying to “pin” the robberies on
Williams. (Tr., p. 815, L. 23 – p. 817, L. 12.) According to Merriam-Webster’s
online dictionary, an “allegation” is “a positive assertion especially of
misconduct.”

(https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/allegation.)

Accusing the police of planting a gun and trying to “pin” a crime on a person
certainly meets this definition. Again according to Merriam-Webster, “ludicrous”
is defined as “meriting derisive laughter or scorn as absurdly inept, false, or
foolish.”

(https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ludicrous.)

The

prosecutor’s argument that the defense “allegation” (assertion of misconduct)
was “ludicrous” (meriting scorn because it was false) was an entirely proper
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argument.

Williams’ argument that the prosecutor’s argument breached his

constitutional rights merits scorn.
Williams next argues the prosecutor “interjected his personal beliefs by
informing the jury that he was offended—personally and on law enforcement’s
behalf—by defense counsel’s actions in defending his client.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 18.) The record, however, does not support Williams’ claim. The prosecutor
did not state that he was offended by the fact defense counsel was defending
Williams. The prosecutor stated he was offended by the allegations that the
officers planted evidence and tried to “pin” crimes on Williams. (Tr., p. 815, L. 20
– p. 818, L. 11.) Even though whether the prosecutor was in fact offended by the
allegation that police planted evidence and tried to “pin” the robberies on
Williams was not subject to presentation of evidence at trial, the argument that
the police did not in fact plant evidence and did not “pin” the robberies on
Williams was squarely based on the evidence presented at trial. (Id.) As set
forth above, the prosecutor’s argument that he was “offended” by the allegations
of police misconduct, which allegations were unsupported by any evidence, did
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, much less a clear and prejudicial
one.
Williams’ third claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that he “vouched for
the police’s credibility by telling the jury that the ‘truth’ was ‘exactly’ what was
said by the police.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) What the prosecutor actually

argued, however, is something quite different than represented by Williams.
After arguing that if the police were willing to plant evidence to “pin” the robberies
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on Williams they would have planted more than the gun (they would also have
planted masks and jackets matching the descriptions of the masks and jackets
used by the robber rather than discovering mask and jacket combinations that,
although similar, did not match the descriptions), the prosecutor argued, “The
truth is that’s not what happened ladies and gentlemen.
exactly what they testified to.

What happened is

These things were legitimately found in the

defendant’s possession.” (Tr., p. 817, L. 14 – p. 818, L. 5.) The prosecutor’s
argument was thus based specifically on the officer’s testimony and a proper
hypothetical that if the defense theory of planted evidence and pinned crimes
were true the evidence would have been different.

There is no reasonable

interpretation of this argument as being based on anything other than the
evidence.
Williams’ fourth and final claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that the
prosecutor “vouched for the police, placing the State’s prestige behind them, by
telling the jury that this case was an example of ‘good police work,’ ‘a fine job,’
and, again, ‘good police work,’ which allowed them to solve the case.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) It was perfectly proper for the state to rebut the defense
argument that the case was about bad police work (planting evidence and trying
to “pin” a crime on Williams) by asserting that the case involved “good police
work.” Williams’ argument is meritless.
Williams has failed to show any of the three elements of a fundamental
error claim. Contrary to Williams’ claims, the prosecutor did not argue that “any
defense was a ludicrous allegation, so offensive to the State and the police, that
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the prosecutor could not help but comment on it.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)
Rather, the prosecutor responded to a specific argument (that evidence was
planted and the police were trying to “pin” the robberies on Williams) and argued
that it was not a credible argument based on the evidence. Because none of the
three prongs of a fundamental error claim are shown by the record, Williams’
claim must be rejected.
III.
Williams Has Failed To Show Error In The Supplemental Brief
A.

Introduction
Williams asserts five claims of error in his supplemental briefing.

(Supplemental Brief of Appellant, Pro Se, p. 1 (hereinafter “Supplemental brief”).)
Review shows these claims to be without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error on the record; the

appellate court will not review the record in search of it.

Woods v. Crouse,

101 Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798 (1980); State v. Knight, 128 Idaho 862, 865, 920
P.2d 78, 81 (Ct. App. 1996). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and
rules of appellate procedure as are parties appealing through counsel. State v.
Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333 (1977); see also Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) (“[t]he right of self-representation is not ... a
license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”).
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C.

Williams’ Claim Of Error For Denial Of “Hybrid” Representation Is Without
Merit
On the first day of trial, prior to jury selection, Williams expressed

dissatisfaction with the tactical decisions of his trial counsel and requested
substitute counsel. (Tr., p. 214, L. 7 – p. 224, L. 12.) The district court explained
that an indigent defendant with appointed counsel did not have the right to
choose which counsel represented him, that differences over trial strategy were
not a proper ground to disqualify appointed counsel, and denied Williams’ motion
for substitution of counsel. (Tr., p. 224, L. 13 – p. 226, L. 7.) The district court
then inquired if Williams wished to proceed with appointed counsel or to exercise
his right to self-representation. (Tr., p. 226, Ls. 8-11.) Williams stated he was
still thinking about that option. (Tr., p. 226, L. 12.) The district court reminded
Williams that the jury was going to be in the courtroom in “about five minutes.”
(Tr., p. 226, Ls. 13-14.) At that point Williams asked, “Could they do voir dire for
me and then I represent myself?” (Tr., p. 226, Ls. 15-16.) The district court
answered, “No. You can either represent yourself or they do.”

(Tr., p. 226,

Ls. 17-18.)
On appeal Williams, based on analogy to the Kentucky Constitution,
claims he has a right under the Idaho Constitution to “hybrid” representation that
was denied by the district court. (Supplemental brief, p. 2.) This claim was not
asserted below, and is therefore not preserved for appellate consideration. State
v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (declining to address
claim that state constitution provided greater protection than the United States
Constitution because defendant failed to preserve argument in district court).
20

Even if the merits of the claim are reached, Williams has failed to show
error because there is no right to “hybrid” representation.

Rather, such is a

matter of discretion for the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896,
898, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980) (“it is permissible to appoint ‘standby’ counsel
to be present in the courtroom in the event the defendant needs and requests
some assistance”); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 886, 136 P.3d 350, 357
(Ct. App. 2006) (“we hold that the appointment of standby counsel is
discretionary and not a matter of constitutional right”). See also United States v.
Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A criminal defendant does not
have an absolute right to both self-representation and the assistance of
counsel.”).

Thus, although Williams had the right to representation at state

expense and the right to self-representation upon waiver of the right to
representation by counsel, he did not have the right to invoke the right to counsel
for parts of the trial and the right to waive it and represent himself for other parts.
D.

Williams Has Failed To Show That Pre-Trial Restraints Violated His Rights
Williams filed a motion to be released “from the excessive shackling he is

subject to while in court” on pre-trial proceedings.

(R., pp. 148-54.)

He

supported it with an affidavit, in which he claimed the restraints caused him “pain”
that made it “difficult to concentrate” and to “communicate,” precluded him from
taking notes, and had thus “grossly interfered with [his] ability to cooperate with
counsel” and “seriously” impaired his “mental facilities,” among other allegations.
(R., pp. 156-57.) The district court heard evidence from Sergeant Harris of the
sheriff’s office and considered argument on the motion. (R., pp. 171-73.) The
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district court denied the motion, first noting that its ruling did not extend to use of
restraints at trial,4 on four bases: (1) the “same” constitutional standards
applicable to trial did not apply to pre-trial proceedings; (2) Williams did not have
any specific physical or psychological conditions exacerbated by the restraints;
(3) Williams did pose “legitimate security risks” because of his history of “crimes
of violence” and assaultive and physically resistive behavior with correctional and
jail staff; (4) the “level of restraints for pretrial hearings are necessary” and “don’t
infringe on constitutional rights.” (R., pp. 173-74.) Application of the relevant
legal standards shows no error.
“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical
restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of
its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.”
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). This is because of the “adverse
effect which the physical restraints [have] upon the presumption of innocence.”
State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 95, 577 P.2d 1135, 1143 (1978). However,
restraints may be used in trial if “overriding concerns for safety or judicial
decorum predominate.” Id. at 96, 577 P.2d at 1144. “Neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court have held that due process
prohibits routine shackling of adults in preliminary proceedings ….” State v. Doe,
157 Idaho 43, 56, 333 P.3d 858, 871 (Ct. App. 2014).

The defense ultimately did not object to the restraints used during trial
proceedings, which were minimal and hidden from the jury. (Tr., p. 182, L. 1 –
p. 184, L. 14; p. 755, Ls. 6-23.)
4
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Williams’ claim of error on appeal fails first because it is moot and
because it is necessarily harmless.

“An issue becomes moot if it does not

present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by
judicial relief.”

State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010)

(citations omitted). Error which, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not contribute to
the verdict is harmless. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814
(2014).

Because Williams’ shackling at pre-trial proceedings did not infringe

upon the presumption of innocence at trial, the error did not contribute to the
verdict and was therefore harmless. Because holding anew the pre-trial hearings
without vacating the verdict is pointless, no viable remedy for the alleged error
can be provided.
Second, however, there was no error by the trial court. The district court
concluded that the constitutional standard regarding restraints in court for pretrial proceedings was not the same as in trial. (R., pp. 173-74.) As shown
above, this was accurate. There was little or no concern that pre-trial restraints
(as opposed to in-trial restraints) would have an “adverse effect” on Williams’
presumption of innocence. See Crawford, 99 Idaho at 95, 577 P.2d at 1143. If,
as Williams argues, the restraints rose to pre-trial punishment, see, e.g., I.C.
§ 19-108 (pre-conviction detention must be no more than necessary to assure
defendant answers the charge), such would have no effect on the fairness of the
trial or of his conviction. Moreover, the district court concluded that the “level of
restraints for pretrial hearings are necessary.” (R., p. 174.) Williams has failed to

23

show error in that conclusion. Williams’ claim of error in relation to pre-trial
restraints fails on both the facts and the law.
E.

Williams Has Shown No Error In The Denial Of The Request For
Substitute Counsel
On the day trial started, prior to the start of jury selection, Williams moved

to substitute appointed counsel. (Tr., p. 214, L. 7 – p. 224, L. 12. See also Tr.,
p. 748, L. 11 – p. 753, L. 19.) The district court denied the motion, concluding
Williams had not alleged any legal conflict, and that the differences in trial
strategy he described did not rise to the level of showing cause for substitution of
counsel. (Tr., p. 224, L. 13 – p. 226, L. 7.) A defendant seeking a different
appointed counsel must demonstrate “good cause” for the substitution. State v.
Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857, 859-60 (2002). “The mere lack of
confidence in an otherwise competent counsel is not grounds for the appointment
of substitute counsel.” State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 237, 335 P.3d 561,
577 (2014).

The district court did not err in denying Williams’ motion for

substitution of appointed counsel.5

Williams further argues that his counsel was ineffective and the district court
should have declared a mistrial. (Supplemental brief, pp. 12-14.) An appellate
court will generally not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel first
raised on direct appeal “because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
regularly raise issues on which no evidence was presented at the defendant’s
trial.” State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549, 989 P.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1999).
5
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F.

Williams’ Argument That The District Court Erred By Not Reversing Its
Decision On Restraints At Trial When He Indicated He Wished To Invoke
His Right To Self-Representation Is Meritless
On the first day of trial, after the district court ruled on the appropriate

restraints at trial and after denying Williams’ motion for substitution of counsel,
Williams expressed a desire to represent himself. (Tr., p. 226, L. 19 – p. 227, L.
2.) Before accepting any waver of the right to counsel, the district court started
giving Williams his Faretta6 warnings. (Tr., p. 227, Ls. 3-11.) As part of those
warnings, the district court informed Williams that it would not change its ruling
on restraints, so Williams would have to present his defense “from the desk.”
(Tr., p. 227, Ls. 12-17.) Williams contended that the presence of restraints would
be “taking it away from my right to represent myself” by not being able to
approach the podium, approach the jury, pace in the well, or present his hand
demonstratively.7 (Tr., p. 227, L. 15 – p. 228, L. 10.) The judge responded to
these arguments by explaining, respectively, that Williams would ask his
questions from the table, would face the jury when addressing them, would not
be in the well, and that a demonstration of his hand as evidence would not be
allowed in opening statement (where it is an inappropriate presentation of
evidence) but arrangements would be made for demonstrating the hand during
the presentation of evidence. (Id.; see also p. 230, L. 4 – p. 231, L. 15.) Williams
concluded that if he were not released from his restraints he would not represent
himself. (Tr., p. 228, Ls. 11-14; see also p. 228, L. 15 – p. 232, L. 15.)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Because the robber was masked, whether Williams’ hand matched
photographic evidence of the robber’s hand was part of the identification at issue
at trial.
6
7
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Williams contends the district court denied him the right of selfrepresentation by declining to remove Williams’ restraints. (Supplemental brief,
pp. 15-21.) This argument fails because it is contrary to applicable law.8 “The
decision whether to shackle a defendant is one that a court must make on
grounds that have nothing to do with his right to self-representation.” United
States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2010). “[T]he defendant’s decision
to proceed pro se does not vitiate the trial court’s ability to employ a reasonable
means of restraint upon a defendant if, exercising its broad discretion in such
matters, the court finds that restraints are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.” State v. Shashaty, 742 A.2d 786, 798 (Conn. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted). Williams’ claim that he can trump the district court’s decision
to employ limited restraints in court by invoking his right to self-representation is
without basis in law.
Moreover, Williams’ invocation of his right to represent himself would have
created no risk that the jury would have become aware of the restraints, and thus
infringe upon the presumption of innocence. See Crawford, 99 Idaho at 95, 577
P.2d at 1143 (use of restraints may have adverse effect on presumption of
Williams also claims facts related to the restraints far different than those found
by the district court. (Compare Supplemental brief, pp. 15-21 with Tr., p. 232, Ls.
3-7; p. 755, Ls. 6-23.) Because Williams has not claimed or shown the district
court’s factual findings to be clear error they must be accepted as the facts on
appeal. Barber v. Honorof, 116 Idaho 767, 770, 780 P.2d 89, 92 (1989)
(“Findings of fact by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous.”). Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts are that
the tether was “not constricting, not tight, [and] not in any way discomforting,” that
Williams could “stand up and move a couple [of] steps freely” and turn around,
and that Williams could display his hand to the jury without revealing the
presence of the tether. (Tr., p. 755, Ls. 6-23.)
8
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innocence). First, Williams’ choice to not represent himself assured there would
be no infringement on his right to be presumed innocent. Second, he was not
compelled or coerced into electing to not represent himself by fear that the
restraints would become known to the jury. To the contrary, the district court
specifically indicated it would make all reasonable accommodations to make sure
that the ankle tether being used in court did not impede Williams’ ability to
present his defense and was not called to the attention of the jury. (Tr., p. 227, L.
23 – p. 231, L. 15; p. 755, Ls. 6-23.) Williams could have fully exercised his right
to self-representation without risk of a violation of his right to be presumed
innocent.
The district court properly concluded that limited restraints (an ankle tether
not visible to the jury) met the proper balance of security with Williams’ trial
rights.

Williams’ temporary invocation of the right to self-representation

(abandoned upon learning that it would not result in a lack of restraints) did not
change that calculus. Rather, the district court reasonably concluded that, with a
few reasonable accommodations, Williams could represent himself without
making the jury aware of the restraint. Williams has failed to show error.
G.

Williams Has Shown No Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motions
Williams filed two motions to suppress.

First, he moved to suppress

evidence obtained “as a result of an illegal arrest.” (R., pp. 90-91.) In relation to
this motion, Williams argued he was arrested without a warrant and without
probable cause. (R., pp. 106-08.) Second, he moved to suppress “all evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search of his hotel room.” (R., pp. 182-206.)
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Williams argued the warrant was issued on “stale” evidence (R., pp. 187-88) and
that it was unreasonable to believe a bank robber would have evidence of his
crimes in his hotel room (R., pp. 188-90). After hearing the testimony of the
investigating police officer (which the district court found “credible and reliable”)
the district court denied the motions. (R., pp. 266-67.)
The district court concluded that the facts that Williams generally fit the
description of the robber and drove a car that likewise fit the description of the
robber’s car gave rise to reasonable suspicion to detain Williams and determine if
he had a distinctive bump on his left hand as was identified in surveillance video
of the robber. (R., pp. 267-77.) Confirming that Williams had a bump on his left
hand as seen on the robber led officers to arrest Williams based on probable
cause. (R., pp. 277-79.) The district court further concluded that the search
warrant was constitutionally valid. (R., pp. 279-85.) Application of the law to the
facts found shows that the district court did not err.9
“An investigative detention is a seizure of limited duration to investigate
suspected criminal activity and does not offend the Fourth Amendment if the
facts available to the officer at the time gave rise to reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity was afoot.” State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644,
181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). Reasonable suspicion requires more than
“a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” but the “quantity and
quality of information necessary” is “less than that necessary to establish
probable cause.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210
The state also specifically incorporates the district court’s thorough fact-finding
and analysis (R., pp. 266-85) in its argument.
9
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(2009) (internal quotations omitted). “Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop.” Id. The district court’s determination
that reasonable suspicion was “abundantly clear” from the totality of the
circumstances, especially given that there was “little doubt” that Williams’ car was
used in the April 2015 robbery (R., pp. 274-75), is consistent with these legal
precedents and standards.
Likewise, the district court correctly concluded that the use of handcuffs,
under the facts of this case, did not amount to a de facto arrest. (R., pp. 272-74.)
A court “must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and determine
whether the investigative methods employed were the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of
time.” State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 368, 986 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1999).
Such circumstances include the “seriousness of the crime, the location of the
encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the officer’s display
of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds.”

Frank,

133 Idaho at 368, 986 P.2d at 1034. “If the use of the handcuffs is a reasonable
precaution to ensure the officers’ safety, the use of the handcuffs is warranted
during the limited stop. If the investigative detention becomes unreasonable, the
detention is transformed into an arrest.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554,
961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998).

Again, the district court’s analysis is entirely

consistent with applicable legal standards.
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The district court also determined that Williams’ arrest was constitutionally
proper. (R., pp. 277-79.) Application of the law to the facts found supports this
conclusion.
Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must
be supported by probable cause.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700

(1981); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).

“Reasonable or

probable cause for an arrest exists where the officer possesses information that
would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.” State v. Buti,
131 Idaho 793, 798, 964 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). The
evaluation of probable cause “must take into account the factual and practical
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.” Id. “In determining whether there is probable cause for an
arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the available
information in light of the knowledge that he has gained from his previous
experience and training.” Id. Probable cause does not require an actual showing
of criminal activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of such activity.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-245 n.13 (1983).

The probable cause

standard necessary for an arrest “must be distinguished from the burden of proof
that is borne by the State at trial” because “[t]he adequacy of probable cause is
not measured against the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
is required for conviction.” State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5 P.3d 488, 490
(Ct. App. 2000).

30

The district court found probable cause existed because Williams’ car
“was almost certainly the same as used in the April 2015 robbery”; that Williams
generally matched the description of the robber “including height, build, haircut
and distinctive nose”; and that officers were “able to confirm” a “large, distinctive
bump on the back of [Williams’] left hand that was in the identical location as
seen in the surveillance still photo of the robber from the April 2015 robbery.”
(R., p. 279.10)

This totality of the circumstances created probable cause to

believe Williams was the robber.
Finally, the district court concluded that Williams had failed to show any
constitutional deficiency in the search warrant for his hotel room. (R., pp. 27985.)

Specifically, the district court rejected claims of “staleness” and lack of

“nexus” with the hotel room, concluding that the evidence submitted to obtain the
warrant was sufficient to establish probable cause that evidence of the robberies,
such as cash, clothing or the gun used would be in the room at the time the
warrant was requested. (Id.) The district court’s analysis is supported by the
applicable law.
“To satisfy the constitutional probable cause standard, evidence must
create probable cause for the belief that the items sought are at the place to be
searched at the time the search warrant is requested.” State v. Carlson, 134
Idaho 471, 479, 4 P.3d 1122, 1130 (Ct. App. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
The state submits that, if this Court finds error in the district court’s conclusion
that the initial detention was not a de facto arrest, officers had probable cause to
arrest even without the evidence of the bump on the hand gained as a result of
the detention. Evidence that Williams generally matched the description of the
robber and his car was “almost certainly” used in at least one of the robberies
created probable cause to arrest Williams for robbery.
10
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“A magistrate need only determine that it would be reasonable to seek the
evidence in the place indicated in the warrant, not that the evidence sought is
there in fact, or is more likely than not to be found, where the search takes
place.” State v. Harper, 152 Idaho 93, 98, 266 P.3d 1198, 1203 (Ct. App. 2011).
“Whether information regarding the presence of items in a particular place
is stale depends upon the nature of the factual situation involved.”

State v.

Turnbeaugh, 110 Idaho 11, 13, 713 P.2d 447, 449 (Ct. App. 1985). Thus, “there
exists no magical number of days within which information is fresh and after
which the information becomes stale.” State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 808, 623
P.2d 110, 116 (1980). “An important factor in “staleness” analysis is the nature
of the criminal conduct. If the affidavit recounts criminal activities of a protracted
or continuous nature, a time delay in the sequence of events is of less
significance.” Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals adopted the following observation:
“‘[t]he observation of a half-smoked marijuana cigarette in an ash tray at a
cocktail party may be stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in; the
observation of the burial of a corpse in a cellar may well not be stale three
decades later.’”

Turnbeaugh, 110 Idaho at 13, 713 P.2d at 449 (quoting

Andreson v. State, 331 A.2d 78, 106 (Md. App. 1975), aff’d sub nom Andreson v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)).

The district court properly rejected the

argument that there was no probable cause to believe Williams would still have
cash, articles of clothing, or the gun because “29 days had passed since the last
robbery.” (R., p. 280.)
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The “nexus” requirement between the evidence sought and the place to
be searched is as follows:
Probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime
does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search that
person’s home. Nonetheless, even though criminal objects are not
tied to a particular place by any direct evidence, an inference of
probable cause to believe that they would be found in that place
can be reasonable. A magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable
inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the
nature of the evidence and the type of offense. Moreover, the
magistrate may take into account the experience and expertise of
the officer conducting the search in making a probable cause
determination.
State v. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006)
(internal citations omitted). The district court properly applied this standard to
conclude that evidence Williams did not check into the hotel until 17 days after
the last robbery was insufficient to defeat the reasonable inferences that items
associated with the robberies would be kept by Williams in his current residence
at the hotel. (R., pp. 282-85.)
Williams disagrees with several of the district court’s findings and its
analysis. (Supplemental brief, pp. 22-35.) He has failed, however, to show clear
error in the district court’s factual findings. State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653,
978 P.2d 212, 213 (1999) (“When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this
Court will defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly
erroneous.”).

More importantly, he has failed to show that the district court

misapplied the law in any fashion.
As shown above, the circumstances known to officers more than
adequately established reasonable suspicion that Williams was the robber
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associated with three bank robberies and thus justified his detention. Further
identification evidence resulted almost immediately from the investigative
detention, leading to an arrest based on probable cause. The inferences from
the evidence submitted to obtain the search warrant for Williams’ temporary
residence for evidence of the prior three robberies were not based on stale
evidence, nor was there any reason to believe that Williams had disposed of all
incriminating evidence in the days since the last robbery, or stored it elsewhere
such that there was no longer a valid belief it could be at his hotel room. In short,
every stop of the investigation complied with the constitutional requirements for
search and seizure. Williams has failed to show error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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